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REBUILDING THE SOVIET NOMENKLATURA 
1945-1948
 
The term “nomenklatura” became popular in Soviet studies in the early 1980s and it
was used to denote both the set of procedures the ruling party developed to conduct
its staffing policies, and the cohort itself of officials who, having been selected
through these procedures, coalesced into the Soviet Union’s “ruling class.” Before
proceeding any further, it is worth pointing out the curious fact that earlier, often
very reputable, histories of the Soviet political system did not even use this term,
although the discovery of “nomenklatura” implied that it revealed something new
and that earlier writers might have missed something important. An implication
like that would be inaccurate. Earlier authors often departed from the common
knowledge that the ruling party, in fact and by its own admission, had appointed its
own members to the most important positions in the state’s administration and in
the party’s own apparatus, since the early stages of the regime. And it was done by a




. The precise staffing
procedures of the country’s institutions could await further more detailed
monographs. Despite the impression of some new revelation, a new key to Soviet
reality, the authors who put such a great emphasis on “the nomenklatura” and “its
power” did in fact tell the same story, sometimes even less competently than others.
Introducing a new, catchy term meant just this — a term. 
On the other hand, the classifier “ruling class” that intended to reveal the
socio-political content of the “Soviet nomenklatura” was potentially a more
interesting idea — had it not been for the fact that it was used, primarily, as an
ideological teaser. “Ruling classes,” it seems, is not the term writers like Milovan
Djilas or Michael Voslensky would use to tease other countries — but they were
ready to use it for the USSR in order to beat it at its own game, using Marxist
vocabulary to imply that the USSR had a class structure and a “ruling class.” But
the play with these terms did not improve matters for us either. All this was said
by — and maybe taken from — say, a Soviet oppositionist like Christian






and 1931 but used “ruling stratum” or “elite”, not “class” — the latter having been a
contentious term among party oppositionists of the 1920s, notably because it was










“Nomenklatura” proponents might have had a point had they explained what
was gained by the new emphasis on “ruling class” instead of some other concept.
An elite is a narrower, less ramified social group than a “class.” A class may contain
one or more elites but it also needs a rather large social base of its own and
supportive groups inside society. If better defined and shown as evolving over time,
the definition and study of such social constructs could have deepened our
understanding of the evolution, vitality or decline of the system, because the





justified at some stage. With a further proviso that the role of the different meanings
and practices related to the term “nomenklatura” needs explaining and should not
be used as just some catchy novelty. 
Be that as it may, we are mentioning the “class” versus “elite” (or “stratum”)
quandary just in passing. Our main focus here for the moment is the actual
technique of the “nomenklatura” as one of the party’s devices to maintain its
control. It is sometimes claimed, notably these days in Russia, that the




 of the regime. We will
show why dealing with “the technique” is of interest, but will also insist that





understood only as part of a broader ongoing process of the bureaucratic takeover
of all the levers of power, whereby the administrative upper layers — the main
object of the party’s control — turned into an encrusted power grid. 
If so, “nomenklatura” in itself was no key to the system. Actually, there was no
single key to this gate although many just craved for one — a bundle of keys is
necessary. Bureaucracy was not just being there — it was evolving, exhibiting
trends and undergoing changes. The ruling networks were “mutating” — and so
was the society around them. No particular technique gives a sufficient account of
the complexity of the phenomenon. Our study does focus on the “technique” and
cannot do much more — but the correlations with broader systemic trends will be
strongly suggested as crucial for the analysis of the stages the system went through
and of its demise. Otherwise, the outlandishly sounding term “nomenklatura”
remains just a scarecrow. 
We are concentrating on the1945-1948 period, notably because good archival
material became available but also because this was an important postwar period
when the system, including the party machinery, had to be rebuilt, thereby
unraveling also many phenomena the party was facing and was going to face till the
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 Occasional glimpses into later years will also be offered to
make these implications clearer. But first, a thumbnail sketch should be offered of
the making of policies that can be grouped under the “nomenklatura” label. 
 
The cadres’ policy: delving into the apparatus of the Central Committee
 
Party and state organizations must be staffed — and the party took this function
upon itself from the very beginning, for the party’s own cadres in the first place.
Quite soon though, all the key positions of power and influence in the state were
included in what became an intricate procedure being worked and reworked as the
system passed through ever more complicated stages. 
“Nomenklatura” meant, at first, a list of key jobs in party and state administrations
to be filled by politically reliable and professionally competent personnel. But the
term came to be used to denote the whole, ever more complicated set of procedures of
selecting personnel for jobs of responsibility, from the highest to the lowest in all the
administrations. A special department in the party apparatus — changing its name
and structure over time — dealt with this task. It worked at establishing lists by












 or ministries themselves) — obviously
depending on the ranks to be filled — to whom names of candidates for office were to
be submitted for final approval (or rejection). The practice was actually begotten
initially by the dearth of leading party personnel during the civil war. It made the early
administrative bodies of the party’s Central Committee — the Organizational bureau,




” (Uchetno-raspredelitel´nyi otdel: Registration
and Distribution Department) — indispensable and overworked. Thus a very much
needed candidate for party secretaryship in a locality — who had to be elected
according to the party’s statute — was sent in from above and quite predictably,
immediately elected. The habit stayed on — the proverbial 
 
Il n’y a que le provisoire
qui dure
 
 proved to be valid yet again: the practice of election of top officials by the
membership of local organizations began to wither away initially, in fact,
unwittingly. 





) for making a revolutionary policy work, also emerged out of the same
experience of the early upheavals in the regime’s history. The dearth of cadres
actually meant dependence of the regime on the availability of energetic and
dedicated leaders who could rally existing supporters or administer political
institutions that could stabilize the new regime’s inherently shifty and fragile
 
2. Archival sources for this paper were found in the State Archive of the National Economy
(Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki — RGAE), in the State Archive of the Russian
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for the Preservation and Study of Documents in Modern History (RTsKhIDNI now renamed
RGASPI — Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-politicheskoi istorii). It is not as yet






foundations. In the longer run, the system’s evolution (into Stalinism) turned the
dependence on cadres into a source of political paranoia and a wish to escape this
liability by periodically turning them into scape goats. Before this aspect actually
becomes visible, we are allowed to argue that Stalin’s slogans concerning the role
of “cadres” contained the seeds not just of his future paranoia, but actually of the
very essence of Stalin’s rule. All this can be gleaned from Stalin’s own presentation
of the problem as he revealed it to the XII Party Congress and put it firmly on the
party’s agenda. 
Stalin wanted cadres to be “people who know how to execute directives,
understand them, accept them as their very own and who know how to transform
them into reality. Otherwise, politics loses its meaning, it turns into ineffectual




 becomes so enormously important.




It is easy to see how a conception like that, if and when it gets actually adopted,
would put an end to the existence of the party as a sovereign political body. Cadres
were here to carry out orders — quite obviously not to participate in choosing the
policies to be executed. Anyone in the party actually belonging to “cadres,” the
party continued to merit the designation “political” so long as oppositions could
still do battle for alternative strategies. Moreover, what is important for our theme
here is the not clear implication of Stalin’s pronouncements on “cadres” that the
quality of policies and strategies decreed from above could never be wrong.
Everything depended entirely on the quality of the executors. The idea of purges as
retribution for failure by cadres to deliver the expected results was inscribed in such
a conception and it remained valid for the whole Stalinist period. 
The nomenklatura before 1946
 
Our sketch of the early stages of the policy borrows details from an article by two
Russian authors, who alternate some judicious statements and an attempt at a broad





see it as a “uniform system,” “military in its harshness,” involving several million
people. Their data do not support this kind of generalization and we will see that
things actually looked rather differently. 
The names of the departments that had been dealing with cadres since the













”  — acronyms pertaining in each case to organization,
registration and distribution of personnel. 
It was the XII Party Congress (April 1923) that called on the Central Committee
to select not just party leaders but also soviet, economic, cooperative and other
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 department had to be strengthened to cope with
the task and in mid-1923, a commission under Molotov and Kaganovich prepared
the resolution “on nominations” that the CC endorsed and the XIII Party Congress
approved. The whole activity aimed, in party jargon, “at getting a handle on the
state apparatus.” It manifested itself, among other things, in “distributing” 10,351
officials to different posts during the whole of 1922, 6,088 in the first quarter of




 had its hands
full, no doubt. The work needed some measure of predictability and this was hoped
to be achieved by officially approved nomenklatura lists. We can quote the lists that
were reworked and spruced up by CC decisions in November 1925. They were
never made public. Initially, there were two of them, with posts listed in list No. 1
needing a final approval from the Central Committee, No. 2 needed coordinating




or whatever name the Central
Committee’s department for cadres had at a given period. 
Later, an additional set of jobs of “elective offices” was produced that had to be
approved or pre-approved by special commissions selected by every body or
congress where the procedure stipulated elections. Other jobs of some importance
not included in these lists went into rolls that were prepared by government and
lower party agencies themselves. They also did the nominating-dismissing because





 was still needed. 









 continued to work on the nomination procedures of candidates to




) and that the procedures had to









 with a distribution of prerogatives for each of these levels to have








 was the final arbiter
on posts from the crucial list No. 1, after they were scrutinized by the two lower
bureaus. This concerned both nominations and dismissals. 
In mid-1926, list No. 1 contained 641 top positions of state and party agencies,
followed again by an other list of posts in “elective boards and offices of central
bodies” with 894 jobs in them. We know that “elective” positions had to be
pre-approved in this system. We won’t waste any irony on the obvious. Most of
them were memberships in the Supreme Soviet’s Presidium, in the Council of
Commissars, the leading bodies of the Central, Russian and other “nationalities
Soviets,” and smaller numbers of leadership positions in agencies — seventeen in
the Komsomol, fifteen in the central Trade Unions, twenty three in the branch trade
unions councils. Institutions of lesser weight had no more than one or two
leadership positions. 
The government-party list No. 2 specified jobs — and numbers of jobholders —
for fifteen commissariats including the Supreme Council of the National Economy




, three key banks, the Supreme Court, the military
 










), the Army’s Political
Directorate, The Chief of Staff, and Commanders of fronts and of military
districts), the GPU, the Central Statistical Agency, TASS, editors of the central
press, Executive Committees of the USSR and the Russian Federation, the
apparatus of the Council of Commissars and of the Central Committee of the party.
The latter included seven heads of departments, twenty positions in the Lenin
Institute, twelve basic regional party bodies — and the party secretariats of
Moscow and Leningrad. 
The total of jobs in both lists — 1,535 — represented positions of importance in
all party-state governing bodies and agencies. 
However dreary such enumerations, they give positions and numbers of the top
governing layer and allow us to realize the relative simplicity of the administrative
system of the NEP — compared to the later 1930s and the postwar period when
listing top party and government bodies would take many pages. The respective
nomenklatura lists expressed this state of affairs. There will be over 41,000 CC-
dependent nomenklatura jobs in 1946. 
So much for the higher ranks. But we remember that lower but important bodies
had their own nomenklaturas for officials under their jurisdiction. On November 16,
1925, all Regional party Committees and equivalent bodies were required to produce
such lists of local (republican, regional, district) top jobs whose nominations





higher body: a central ministry or a party body, according to the rank and importance
of the job. The procedures could take on different forms. If the nomination was





arbitrate and help reach a final decision. 





 and get final approval from the CC. 
Without questioning the very principle of a central nomenklatura, two top









 and requested more coordination of the
nominations in question with leaders of these administrations — an attitude other
top managers of administrative bodies certainly shared and probably criticized in
private more sharply — although in those years it was still possible to do it openly
too, before the CC. 
The procedures of applying the lists to real life brought tens of thousands of













) or instructions. Many of them were not on the CC lists but
not everyone understood the intricacies of the procedures. The offices in question













), as party members quipped and

























session (December 1926) in the CC building claimed that a privileged caste of party
workers was being created in this way and there would be no safeguard anymore
against the infiltration of “hangers-on” into the party — a fact that created
“murmurs” in the ranks of conscientious workers. One speaker on the same session,
after having quoted some relevant statistics, exclaimed: “how can we achieve a
growing experience and professionalism when in just two years almost the whole










endemic in the nomination process and would remain so, at least, well into
Khrushchev’s days. 
The nomenklatura procedures became extremely frenetic and ever more
disorderly during the hectic 1930s, entirely disturbed and confused by the great
purges, beginning after Kirov’s assassination at the end of 1934. Parallel to the
massive destruction of cadres, there went on a desperate and chaotic promotion to
replace “enemies of the people” that were exiled, imprisoned or shot. Considering
the scale of the upheaval, there is no reason to expect any orderly “cadres’ policy”
in those years, especially when the party’s departments entrusted with conducting
this business were being constantly purged themselves. 
The personnel policies would have to endure some more upheavals, notably
during WWII and immediately thereafter — we will mention those later. Suffice it
to say for the moment that when peace came and such policies were put again on the
agenda of the party apparatus, the theme was discussed as if the nomenklatura
system had no precedents and was being established from scratch. In many other
cases, when a state institution was being founded, precedents — notably from the
tsarist past — were carefully considered. But the restoration of the by now “old”
nomenklatura “technique” proceeded, apparently without referring to its past —
except for hints in passing that the “currently existing one” was never formally
approved. That was somewhat puzzling in view of the fact that the two leaders who
had “manufactured” and run this cadre policy since its inception, Kaganovich and






 positions. Were they being snubbed because
Stalin apparently groomed “an outsider” from Leningrad, the new secretary
Kuznetsov, to become his heir without consulting his old acolytes? This is one of
the possible speculations. There could be others. 
1946: the turning point 
 





task of directing the country’s administrative leadership towards peacetime aims:
ideological education or re-education of the cadres themselves and of the
population at large, mobibilization of the country to fulfill the first peace-time
Five-Year Plan, in conditions of devastation and misery created by the war and by
policy blunders. A few quite revealing phenomena concerning the party and its






The pivotal department in the apparatus of the CC that dealt with personnel
matters of all the upper ranks in state and party administrations was called at that








 or Directorate for brevity’s sake. This important party agency met with
the new CC Secretary A. A. Kuznetsov (June 21, 1946), in a closed session, to
discuss the state of the cadres’ policy in the country and of this department itself.
The source — substantial and quite unique minutes — offers a wealth of




 The session was closed even to important
members of any other CC department. One such official was spotted and quite
unceremoniously asked to leave. From the numerous speeches of the participants
who took the floor, one could learn that consultations of this type — frank, all ranks
present, comradely in tone and roaming over quite a vast panorama of problems and
information — never occurred before in the department nor, as far as these
participants knew, anywhere else in the rest of the party apparatus. Heads of
Directorates or chiefs of sectors tended to do things “from above” without much
consultation and this will become even more obvious to the reader, after he gets
acquainted, later in this paper, with the CC’s steep rank pyramid. Bureaucratic
manners, it transpires, were ripe in the central apparatus itself — and one can sense
from Kuznetsov’s reactions to the complaints of the officials present at this session
that he would like to do something about this. But the first point of order was the
task ahead. Since the last CC meeting, a few months before, the whole apparatus of
the party had been undergoing changes in an effort to improve its performance —
but it still suffered from many weaknesses. 
During the war problems with and performance of the apparatus were not dealt
with. The whole party structure was busy handling basically war-time, mainly
economic tasks. The boundaries between institutions were blurred: “It was difficult
to discern where the CC apparatus ends and where the apparatus of the State
Defense Committee or of Ministries begins” — testified one of the speakers. The





 selected and distributed 96,000 officials, always “on
the double,” as war requirements usually imposed. Moreover, many leading party




 itself that was constantly plagued by endless shortcomings, in particular
the absence of intra-departmental coherence. Its sectors specializing in different
branches — the military, aviation, metallurgy, electrotechnical output — did not





substance,” some others less so or not at all. Consequently, chiefs of the important









Russian) — others were not. 
At the same time, the very fact of working for such branches opened a window
to a broader liability that could have been suspected by students of the system, but
can now also be documented. To put it simply, such sectors of the party apparatus
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) to the ministries. Ministers therefore





matters of nominations of their top personnel (even if they belonged to the




 looked on and were afraid





 They mostly sided with the choices made by ministers and not with





As one would have expected, the knowledge of the cadres at large was scanty —
and the nomenklatura system must have been rather in abeyance. We learn that
“nobody approved it, nobody examined it.” Hence, thousands of important posts
were vacant or were occupied by people who were not being approved for months,
because “we did not know the cadres.” By June 1946, 5,697 officials — 14% of the
putative (not approved) nomenklatura — had been on the job without confirmation,
sometimes for about a year. 
The way an energetic secretary like Kuznetsov would like this work to look




 of a reserve of
candidates for high positions. A candidate for a ministerial job was usually offered
ten days after the request was made — when it should be offered, according to
Kuznetsov, the very next day! An apparatchik’s dream of a pushbutton supply of a




 was looking for one. In the
meantime, the reality was different. Officials were not being replaced fast enough
or removed at all — whereas the situation warranted that many be removed
urgently, including from the ranks of many deputy-ministers. Many nominations
were made in a hurry — with sometimes catastrophic results. To illustrate the latter
case, Kuznetsov shared a secret with his audience: “Why beat about the bushes?
We are in a closed meeting today. We should say that it is also urgent to replace a
number of ministers.” One alarming example of the party apparatus’ failure in
supervision and judgment occurred during the war. “This is a very unpleasant, dirty




 It turns out that during the war, the air force was
receiving defective planes from industry. Numerous plane crashes and the death of
many pilots could be attributed to this criminal mismanagement. The front
frequently needed more aircrafts but thousands of planes remained grounded in
airports, unable to fly. The thing was hidden for some years from comrade Stalin —




 that had to control things did not react.
They actually knew but kept quiet about it. 
Obviously, those directly involved in the affair were punished — but Kuznetsov
did not elaborate. (At that time he did not know that the accusations against the
Minister of Aircraft Building and other officials were bogus — most of them
survived miraculously and were rehabilitated under Khrushchev.) What counted




 still did not know the cadres well enough,

















ashamed to admit its error or tried not to wash its dirty linen in public. Many “flops”
were cited — nominees who did not cope, or who actually were released from
camps after they did their time for trotskyism or some other reprehensible
transgression. What irked Kuznetsov most was the fact that the firing of such
people was initiated by Abakumov (Head of the secret police), when the initiative
should have come from the apparatus’ Upravlenie. 
The new approach
The minutes of the Cadres’ Directorate meetings and other sources offer the outline
of measures the Politbiuro envisaged in order to put its own house and its cadres’
policy at large in order.11 Hence, an effort to redefine the functions of the whole
apparatus, to clarify the division of labor among them and, not less significantly, to
change the way the central apparatus dealt with the economy. Astonishing as it
might have sounded, this apparatus was now to shun direct involvement in the
details of economic management and of those managers’ performance! From now
on, functions and spheres of action between party and state had to be redefined and
separated. The CC — it was now clarified — was a policy setting body (direktivnyi
organ) — it provided guidelines or directives to the Government. The apparatchiki
were, clearly, baffled to hear that the CC would no longer deal directly with
economic problems. In fact, economic departments in the CC — like the one for
agriculture or transportation — were being liquidated. The orientation was now for
the apparatus to deal mainly with the party itself and all top cadres — without
looking into their basic branch activities and performance. The CC would, of
course, continue to give directives to the government, including on the economy. In
addition, through the supervision of the cadres, problems of economic performance
will keep coming up, so to speak, indirectly. Local party organs on the other
hand — like the Regional party Committees (obkomy) that carried out “executive”
(ispolnitel´nye) functions — should keep the economic sectors in their apparatus
and continue supervising the economic sphere as before. Obkomy should not copy
the structure of the CC. 
In an effort to introduce some clarity into the ever more obscure frontiers
between the top two bodies just below the level of the Politbiuro, it was now stated:
the Orgbiuro will deal with local party organs, call them in and listen to their
reports, propose improvements — though this was not how the Party Statute
previously defined its task. The Orgbiuro was a body working in regular pre-set
sessions or meetings (zasedaiushchii). The Secretariat, on the other hand, was a
permanently working body that met every day, at any time of the day, as needed. Its
main functions consisted in preparing the agenda and the materials for Orgbiuro
meetings and in checking the execution of decisions made by the Orgbiuro and the
Politbiuro. The Secretariat was also to be responsible for the distribution of leading
11. Ibid., l. 1-125.
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cadres all over the system (through the appropriate TsK departments). Helping
local party organizations to control effectively state and economic organs, criticize
them, be political leaders of the masses, was now the main objective of the top party
leadership and those were the terms they used. 
What caused this kind of reorganization, “away from economics”? We were
offered only a hint so far — but the depth of the problems demands an elaboration
and the documents are not shy: massive facts, from many sources, Kuznetsov’s
obvious urge to air the problems frankly — “we are among ourselves here” —
point to a far from rosy picture in local party bodies, i.e. in any party organization
below the CC, but even the central apparatus itself was in the danger zone. 
The main cause for alarm was the widespread phenomenon of the subjugation of
party officials to economic ministries. 
One aspect of this subjugation was sometimes called “self-supply”
(samosnabzhenie), which covered different and widespread practices. Heads of
state agencies — especially the economic ministries or their lower agencies,
offered, illegally it turns out, financial inducements like premiums, prizes, bonuses,
valuable gifts, endless services (dacha building, home improvements, places in fine
sanatoriums) for local party secretaries and their families — all from ministerial
coffers of course, i.e, from state coffers. This economic cushioning of the party elite
“took on very vast proportions,” our source states.12
More material about this comes from another Kuznetsov document from the
latter part of 1947.13 The PB had just issued a stern decree against the practice of
party people being given premiums by economic managers. During the war, the
practice was generalized — and it went “from top to bottom.” Moreover, in
conditions of food shortages and low living standards — in 1947 it was more like
famine, rather than just low living standards — , there were numerous cases of
party bosses from the party hierarchy actually engaging in illegal so-called
“pobory” (meaning requisitions, if not extortions, of food, merchandise, etc.) from
economic organizations. These, of course, were crimes. Such practices, again
according to Kuznetsov, “are in essence a form of bribe that puts the party
representative in a state of dependence from economic agencies.”14 This means that
the interests of the agencies were served to the detriment of state interests. The
defense of state interests against any particularism being the task of the party, how
can party officials defend those interests if improving their own material situation
depends on bonuses and benefits from economic managers or other administrators?
Ministries were putting party bosses, including highly placed central apparatus
leaders in all the regions of the country, on lists for remunerations — “and this is
wrong,” said Kuznetsov during the 1946 meeting with the Upravlenie.15 Massive
facts about these practices were uncovered and reported to Stalin not by the party
12. Ibid., l. 8.
13. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 572.
14. Ibid., l. 10.
15. Ibid., f. 17, op. 127, d. 999, l. 9.
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apparatus — we already know that this causes a high party secretary to wince —
but by Lev Mekhlis, Minister of State Control. 
The central apparatus knew all this but did not report because they did not
ascribe much importance to such behavior. It was, as we just learned, so widespread
that they — we surmise — got used to this. Stalin supposedly declared that such
usage of national resources was a crime. “Bribes” create cozy “family” relations,
party bodies become playthings in the hands of managers. If continued, such a
shameful situation would spell ruin for party people. 
Whether such wording really came from Stalin, or was Kuznetsov’s own, the
problem and the task were stated quite dramatically: “Party organizations must
regain their independence” (Partiinye organizatsii dolzhny stat´ nezavisimymi).16
This alarming situation was the underlying reason for the decision to take the
central party apparatus out of the economic activity and to restore the party’s proper
functions as the leaders saw them: going back to controlling everyone’s cadres but
no longer being directly involved in economics. The menace of a monumental
sellout of the political agency to the economic ones required urgent action. It would
not take long to realize that the directive “to get out of the economy and go back to
party work” would produce complicated side effects. 
The picture we just contemplated had, as we already hinted at, yet another twist
to it, although the source was the same. In addition to the loss of power as
result of “getting bribed,” there was yet another “leakage” in the supposedly tight
party-dominated system — ministries tended to disregard nomenklatura rules in
many ways and did not respect the Upravlenie very much (“When did you see a
minister coming into the Upr. kadrov lately?” asked one discussant. This was met
by an interjection: “And when did you see his deputy here?” — which brings us
again, in this context, to the same outcry from the apparatchiki: “We lost
power!” —stated one of the speakers. They certainly realized that if ministries
treat nomenklatura rules so carelessly and sometimes just do what they wish with
and to it — what other means exist to control them, what other functions can the
Upravlenie possibly have? Kuznetsov confirmed expressis verbis at the end of
1947: ministries treat the central nomenklatura “in an unacceptable manner.” More
broadly, “The habit of nominating and dismissing officials that were included in the
Center’s nomenklatura without the approval of the Central Committee took on
unacceptable dimensions.”17 A number of ministries made 70-90% of their staffing
decisions on positions included in the Central nomenklatura without informing and
asking for the CC’s consent. They did ask for authorization much later, when the
people in question were already either in or out. Now the Central Committee
requested that the Upravlenie put an end to this practice. From now on, proposals of
changes of jobs or their listing in a nomenklatura of a particular level of the
government hierarchy should be discussed in the appropriate CC institution. In all
cases, the Upravlenie should begin the procedure and next, depending on the
16. Ibid., l. 10-11.
17. Ibid., f. 17, op. 121, d. 572, passim.
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importance of the job, the case would go higher up. The Upravlenie should, in cases
of transfers or dismissals, deal simultaneously with candidates for replacement.
Ministries do have the right to propose these changes, and the Upravlenie is warned
that it should not make decisions of this kind inside its own apparatus (apparatnym
putem). The matter must be submitted for final decision to the CC. 
It is clear from such materials that the procedure did not automatically entail
sending in nominees chosen unilaterally by the CC. The government agencies
themselves were involved and probably suggested most of the candidates for
nomination. Except in cases of a big failure and crisis in some ministry, or when an
entirely new agency was created, new leaders might have been sent in from above
by the CC apparatus. 
Another weak link of the cadres’ policy stemmed from the endemic weakness of
the cadres’ departments that existed in every ministry. A special post of
deputy-minister for cadres was created by Politbiuro decision in 1938, but they did
many things except running directly their personnel department. The problem was
actually studied by inspectors who found that in 48 out of 57 ministries and other
government agencies, deputy-ministers did not interview candidates for jobs, did
not bother to staff personnel departments with qualified officials, did not assign
them to adequate offices, did not approach the CC with any problems concerning
this whole sensitive activity. Not to mention the fact that the crucial precaution of
having a list of candidates on reserve, as was prescribed to them in 1946, was
neglected.18
A CC decision was, of course, enjoining deputy-ministers to mend the
deficiencies of their cadres’ departments, to stay in touch with party bodies of the
appropriate level. The Upravlenie, naturally, should look for better candidates for
those jobs of deputy-ministers for cadres — although all these measures had to be
taken in consultation with the respective leaders of the concerned government
agencies. 
Again, an additional revealing feature emerges in this context: ministries tended
to discuss and decide nominations with their direct superior — the Council of
Ministers with whom they handled most of their other important problems. So the
cadres’ problem would also pop up, “as one would say, somewhere in the vicinity
of items like metal, cement and timber,” quipped Kuznetsov, leaving the CC out.19
From the party’s point of view, such shortcomings in cadres’ policy, made a string
of major failures unavoidable. In many ministries, cadres were selected on
“grounds of family ties.” The source gives numerous examples: bosses hired their
relatives and covered up for their incompetence or even for their misconduct,
offered jobs to pals with criminal records, hired thieves or would-be thieves, others
who soon turned out to be traitors (and flee abroad…), nominated weak people,
without principles, bootlickers who contributed to an impression of efficiency but
hid their failures from the CC. The worst offenders were to be found, probably, in
18. Ibid., l. 242, 246.
19. Ibid., l. 236-239.
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agencies dealing with supply and commerce: “cadres are selected here, as a matter
of common practice, on the basis of personal acquaintance, sale and purchase of
positions, and also on grounds of common ethnicity.”20 
The list of personal and institutional misconduct all over the state administration
was long. Obviously, a strong intervention was needed. The implications were —
the reader certainly noticed — that this heavy price was attributed to the tendency
of state officials to handle cadres among themselves, or to defer to the Council of
Ministers, thus escaping the party’s watchful eye. But the watchful eye — the
Central party apparatus — was not innocent and could not be left out from the
Secretariat’s indictment. The absence of proper oversight was the fault of officials
from the Upravlenie although they were part of the Central party apparatus — the
system’s sancta sanctorum, not less, as was sometimes preached to apparatchiki to
make them do their work with a deeper sense of their mission. 
The material we have presented so far has unveiled features of the system that
were overlooked or misunderstood before. They pertain to the nature of the Soviet
bureaucracy and the problems it created for the party. The idea of a
“nomenklatura,” a “ruling class” composed of all those nominees, tightly
controlled from above, actually helped miss deeply seated trends and fissures that
the party had to deal with and never managed to overcome. 
The nomenklatura: a renewal
How was the apparatus reorganized?
The CC secretary A. A. Kuznetsov appeared before a closed meeting of directors of
party schools towards the end of 1947, and presented to the audience the reforms in
state administrations and the party’s own apparatus that had been launched a year
before, adding more details on this occasion to clarify the rationale of the “new
line.”21 
The work done so far aimed at a “perestroika” of the managerial structures of
state administrations, notably in the economy where a great number of factories that
worked for the war turned to civilian production. The perestroika going on
simultaneously in the party apparatus aimed at streamlining these party bodies to be
able to effectively guide the state apparatus during a difficult transition to
peace-time reconstruction. It is interesting to note that whereas the principle of
efficiency in the state machinery dictated the need to break up many oversize
ministries into smaller agencies, the opposite principle seemed to be more
expedient inside the party apparatus. The party had to concentrate on launching and
propagating the first postwar Five-Year Plan. The previous slogan of “everything
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid. 
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for the front,” was to be replaced by “everything for the Five-Year Plan,” which
seemed like the best set of objectives to unite the population around. That was
important in view of the fact that the VKP(b) had no (formal) program. A program
commission was established by the XVIII Party Congress (its work was probably
interrupted by the war). “Our program consists, in substance, of Stalin’s
Constitution and the FYP” — a rather ambiguously sounding statement from a CC
secretary.22 He could not have stated anything like that without Stalin’s pre-
approval or direct instruction, which allows us to surmise that Stalin did not need
party programs anymore — he was the program. 
In this meeting with party school directors, a clear division of labor was
established between the CC and the Council of Ministers. The CC no longer
intended to handle economic problems directly. A streamlined Upravlenie would
now be entrusted with handling all the leading personnel of state administrations and
of the party. All this required reorganization. If the party apparatus was in
considerable flux almost all the time, the basics always remained, more or less, the
same. This is why the structure entrusted with handling cadres that emerged in 1946-
1947 is sufficiently instructive for us to delve into in some detail. The Director
should have five deputies. The Upravlenie, instead of its 50 departments (otdely)
would now have 28 — a group of ministries and other agencies being assigned to
each of them. There would be one registration department for the whole Upravlenie
and several other service sectors. Among the 28 departments, one for cadres of party
organizations, another for soviet institutions, for the armed forces, for training and
retraining party cadres, for internal affairs, foreign trade, one for the complex of state
security-prosecution-the judiciary, another for communications, a sector for each of
the main branches of industry, as well as agriculture, finance and trade, higher
education and science, publishing, art… A very complicated Upravlenie indeed, and
a rather bulky one, employing about 650 officials. Probably the biggest in the CC
apparatus — until new changes, only two years later would send the whole
apparatus back to an earlier functional-economic pattern. 
By the beginning of 1949, the specialized branch sectors of the Upravlenie were
transformed into separate independent departments. Officially they would just deal
with the cadres in these branches. In fact, such CC departments would continue to
get enmeshed, volens nolens, with the managerial structures in the economy
because of the very character of the branch system — a phenomenon that the 1946
reforms of the apparatus tried to forestall. Thus, what was supposed to be a turning
point in 1946 became “a returning point” two years later. This will become clear
when we look somewhat more closely at several features of this “return.” 
Instead of the bulky Upravlenie for cadres and the more narrowly specialized
department for inspecting party organizations,23 a new scheme made its
appearance. Another document (that has no date, but is probably from the
22. Ibid., l. 228.
23. The “Orginstr” was also reorganized, having recourse to inspectors recruited from the best
ex-regional or other experienced medium-level secretaries. 
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beginning of 1949) explained the organizational chart: the apparatus of the CC
(under the overall guidance of, mostly, the Secretariat and an important role in it for
the Orgbiuro) supervises and deals with problems pertaining to the working of
central government agencies (115 ministries) and organizations (republican and
regional party bodies) that are distributed among the new CC departments.24 It was
not going to be an easy task for any of them in view of the fact that each of those
state agencies engendered multitudes of local branches and especially incoherent
supply-and-marketing networks that proved problematic to every and any
inspecting agency. Consequently, the object of the apparatus’ supervision was an
ever more complex labyrinth of networks. 
Each of the apparatus’ departments had its own internal structure with varying
degrees of complexity, and each one had its own registration unit. But there also
was a service structure common to the whole CC. These general “supervisory
departments” included the statistical service, but also coordinating departments like
the general secretary’s “special unit,” a secret and an encoding sector, and different
“groups” and “special officers” not well known to outsiders, including a group for
serving foreigners, a separate “department of the CC” (possibly an auxiliary
secretariat for the Orgbiuro?), a pivotal “General department” through which all
important papers and assignments “traveled” to and from the other departments, a
“Business office” (Upravlenie delami), a public information group for responding
to letters, a group dealing with the “unified membership card and membership
registry,” “a commission for travel abroad,” a special “Kremlin group,” a unit
dealing with “auxiliary farms” (probably part of the Business Department that also
had a car-and-technical sector). 
As we can see, the organization chart of the country’s power hub was anything
but simple. But before we raise the question whether it was adequate for the
immensity it was supposed to oversee, a detour into the regime’s ideological trends
of the times may be useful. 
The Zhdanov context 
The spirit of the policy of Zhdanovism also made a deep imprint on the life of state
administrations and of the party apparatus itself where large numbers of educated
people were employed. The introduction into top party and state agencies of the
archaically sounding “Courts of Honor” squared poorly with any solid
administrative logic and mightily interfered with substantive efforts to improve the
professional level of the state and party apparaty. These “Courts” were supposed to
instill in the apparatchiki a sense of patriotism and pride in the unique achievements
24. Among them: propaganda and agitation, party-komsomol-trade unions, international
relations, branch departments for heavy industry, light industry, engineering (machine
building), transportation, agriculture, and a powerful new “administrative” department for
handling the cluster of security agencies and the cluster of agencies in fields of
planning-finances-trade. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 572.
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of their (Stalinist) fatherland through staged mock trials inside the agencies. The
culprits would be accused of all kind of infamous behavior — but mostly only
careers would suffer. By official recognition, such “courts” would deal with
“crimes” charged with treasonable connotations, yet not subject to criminal
prosecution.25 
The explanation of this policy by Kuznetsov, who had to reorganize the
apparaty, in a report he presented to the full body of the party apparatus (September
29, 1947), makes it clear that the operation was aimed at the educated layers — the
intelligentsia — including the growing number of specialists.26 The central
apparatus was not considered immune to the disease and the meeting was convened
in order to elect the aforementioned “Court of Honor” for the CC apparatus, and
thereby inaugurate elections of such Courts in every administrative body of the
country. Their declared aim was to combat behavior that exhibited “crawling to” or
“fawning upon” the West. 
A “Court” was created also in the Ministry of State Security, whose operatives
were seemingly irked by the implication that they, of all people, should need such a
“court,” but Kuznetsov told them (during a separate meeting with them) that if the
party — the country’s main citadel — needs one, then the MGB had no reason to
lag behind it.27 Thus, security agencies needed, like any other body, the
immunizing stuff these “Courts” were supposed to instill: a patriotism and a certain
“spiritual independence” that were based on realizing the superiority of Soviet
culture over the Western one, etc. 
The hoped for turning point in the moods and consciousness of large chunks of the
“contaminated” Soviet intelligentsia should begin, in the first place, in the apparatus
of the CC. The document allows us to peep into some of the neuralgic spots of this
apparatus. The work of the country — so runs the argument — depends on the quality
of the party apparatus. The “Courts of Honor” should be important here. The
apparatus was harboring numbers of employees who indulged in anti-patriotic,
anti-social and anti-state transgressions. When cases like that became known, they
tended to be handled internally, in a close circle, without publicity. This stemmed
from the widespread belief that once a person was an apparatus insider, vigilance
towards him and need of political betterment do not apply anymore. But many of
them failed to understand that work in the party central apparatus — the system’s
sancta sanctorum (the text states this, as often on other occasions, though not in
Latin) — is not routine employment.28 It is a party duty. And yet, dissolute behavior
was observed even among leaders in the party apparatus — absolutely inadmissible
25. The “Courts of Honor” were abolished or lapsed some two years later, as happened
somewhat later, to the ridiculous uniforms and antiquated bureaucratic ranks and shoulder
straps that were imposed on ranking officials, common in spirit to the “Courts of Honor” and
part and parcel of the dark ages of “Zhdanovism.” 
26. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 572, l. 110 and passim.
27. Ibid., l. 217-218.
28. Ibid., l. 182.
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in party ranks, let alone in the central apparatus. Drinking, sexual licentiousness,
careless handling of secret party documents were among the most frequent misdeeds
cited here. But they were dangerous because the CC received data on all aspects of the
country’s activities — including defense and foreign relations. This is why, quite
independently from the position held, the work done in the party apparatus was
confidential. Vigilance was the main tool of the party’s fight against its enemies, and
an unbreakable principle of the country’s life. 
The official policy, at least as announced to the central apparatus, drew its
inspiration from the methods of the great purges, suffusing it with a particularly
sinister connotation. Some of the key sign-posts of this policy of the “great purges”
were listed as useful reminders. Among them the “closed” letters to party members
that launched those policies — dated January 18, 1935 — concerning actions against
“Kirov’s murderers”; the July 29, 1936, circular about the Trotsky-Zinov´ev
“terrorist block”; the May 13, 1935, letter about party membership cards; the June 29,
1941, circular to party and state agencies in the districts near the front — all of them
preceding or following terrorist waves against the country’s population and
especially the cadres themselves. The shadow of the sinister policies was deliberately
invoked to serve as a warning against the potentially disloyal intelligentsia. 
All this was brought to the attention of the cadres to make them understand the
spirit of a campaign aiming at inculcating no less than “independence of mind.”
The foreign espionage factor was also put to work. International espionage tries to
penetrate the party apparatus — when they do not succeed, they go after the
apparatchiks’ family members. You tell your wife, she tells a neighbor — and
everyone gets wind of confidential state matters. One example, particularly jarring
for party leaders, concerned the 1948 top-secret government decision to raise
prices. The fact became known to the population beforehand and caused a panicky
rush on every open or presumably closed store. All because of "family
chatter-boxes" from the party apparatus.29
The purges accompanying this “Zhdanovism” did not take on the scale of the
1936-1939 persecutions, they nevertheless produced such atrocities as the
destruction of Jewish writers, numerous arrests (and some deaths) of cultural
figures — not to mention many broken individual careers and destroyed works of
art and science. In 1950, the so called “Leningrad affair” was tragically concluded
by putting to death the former leadership of the Leningrad party and state — first
among them Kuznetsov himself, and the deputy Prime-Minister and Gosplan Head
Voznesenskii… 
All this is important to us in order to understand the atmosphere that suffused the
country and the party, at the time when the same CC secretary, from whom we just
learned about the essentials of “Zhdanovism,” also wanted to do the important job
of rationalizing the work with cadres. The difference in tone and spirit between
Kuznetsov’s presentation of the official ranting in 1947, and the tone of his frank
and reasonable discussion with the Upravlenie a year earlier is striking. 
29. Ibid., l. 188.
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An administrative way to save an administration
The reorganization of the apparaty in itself seemed not to be directly connected to
the themes instigated by “Zhdanovism,” intended to provide indoctrination for a
renewed ideological monolithism and fervor in a society tired by years of
industrialization, collectivization and war. The administrative changes on the
party’s agenda, although related to war events, seemed to react to different classes
of phenomena. The “economization” of the party was the name of the game that
alarmed the leadership more than ever before. What seemed to be at stake in this
context was the very existence of the party as a ruling institution. During the war,
processes leading to its becoming “an appendage” to ministerial managers and
losing their own power were deepening. No wonder — they were in fact being
“paid off” or “bribed” by the managers, who also tended to defer more to the
Council of Ministers and to pay ever less attention to the nomenklatura of the CC.
Data on not heeding these rules abound. 
Extricating the central apparatus from direct involvement with economic
agencies, except with regard to general guidelines and cadres, seemed to be the
remedy for the disease. The “Zhdanovism” factor seemed to suggest a solution. The
Upravlenie had previously preferred to recruit technically trained people
(tekhniki) — now “humanists” (“gumanitarniki”: graduates in the humanities) would
be favored in order to catch any ideological slips, such as “alien” passages in an
opera, or the publication of a poorly scrutinized Lenin biography. “Technicians”
could not understand, let alone combat ideological subversion. A menace like the
“economization” of the party — something much more prosaic but less obvious —
that began to be seen as dimming the party’s ideological outlook would be entirely
beyond the wit of such “technicians.”
“Getting out of the economy,” and presumably into politics and ideology,
required an answer to the question: what exactly was the ideological framework
that was seen as losing its vigor? And what could be counterposed to western
capitalist influences? A line like “getting out of the economy” could not, in itself,
serve as an ideological underpinning for badly needed reinvigoration of the
system. 
We are touching here on a nerve center in the party’s ideological armor at its
moment of glory after the victory over Germany. Stalinism at this stage could not
and did not wish to criticize capitalism from socialist positions anymore — it
clearly lost for good this ideological coagulator which was also implied in
Kuznetsov’s cryptic statement that the party “has no program” but the Stalin
Constitution and the Five-Year Plan. It would certainly be imprudent for leaders
selected by Stalin to raise with him a problem of such import. The terms of “losing
out to managers” might have been suggested by Stalin himself — but implying that
under him the party lost its original ideological vigor would be suicidal. But here
certainly was the root of the “economization” of the party’s cadres. Stalin himself
was aware of it. The policies of “Zhdanovism” were certainly undertaken at Stalin’s
behest, proving that he was aware of the ideological weakness of the regime and
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decided to offer a different ideological “coagulator” and mobilizer. Our sketch
showed what this consisted of, a virulent kind of nationalism, replete with ideas
akin to fascism. But it was part of the malady, rather than a cure. 
In any case, the reforms imply that a better division of labor between the CC and
the Council of Ministers could initiate a cure. The Council of Ministers should run
its show (of running the economy — among others) — the apparatus of the CC
should mind the business of staffing key posts and oversee the activity of cadres’
departments of all institutions. 
Be that as it may, the 1946-1948 efforts at an administrative reshuffling of the
party apparatus were also indicative of the nomenklatura as a technique, and of its
problems till the end of the regime’s existence, independently of other ongoing or
changing political and ideological circumstances. 
The nomenklatura of the Central Committee: a sociological approach
The resurrection of the Central Committee’s nomenklatura list was a key device
that exacted a massive effort from the Upravlenie and from the apparatus’ three
superior bureaus — Politbiuro, Orgbiuro (abolished in 1952) and the Secretariat.
We can now examine “the list” more closely — and next figure out how it was
supposed to be enacted in practice. 
A document signed by Andreev — head of the Upravlenie — and by Revskii, his
deputy, on August 22, 1946, addressed to four secretaries of the CC — Zhdanov,
Kuznetsov, Patolichev, Popov —, presented a version of the nomenklatura list30
— but we should remember that the data fluctuate somewhat from one version to
another. The list included 42,894 jobs that its compilers praised as being better
adapted to the needs of the Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950. The Upravlenie was
also working on the much needed, so-called “reserve registry” — an auxiliary list
of candidates for nomenklatura jobs in case of a rising demand. The latest version
of the renewed nomenklatura eliminated about 9,000 positions from the previous
rolls. Many exclusions and inclusions were necessary to account for changes in
economics and technology and the concomitant changes in the relative importance
of the different jobs.
It took about three more months for the first (post-war) “Nomenklatura of posts
of the Central Committee” to be approved, in stages, in October or November
1946 — offering the apparatus a document that could now serve as CC’s blueprint
for working with top cadres. The Upravlenie delivered for this purpose not just a list
of posts to be filled according to this nomenklatura’s rules. They also produced
quite a detailed study of the officials who were already holding these posts at that
time. 
30. Ibid., f. 17, op. 127, d. 1317.
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A sketch of the bureaucracy
This informative document — now referring to a total of 41,883 positions (and
officials) — allows to compose a “portrait” of the whole cohort considered most
sensitive in the system.31 The classification offered is laborious and detailed. First,
an enumeration of the jobs the CC wanted to see “on its own nomenklatura”: the
first place is taken by “posts in party organizations” mentioning all the positions
and ranks — from CC Secretaries and their deputies to heads of departments and
their deputies, heads of “special sectors and cipher clerks.” The same was true for
republican and local party bodies, directors of party schools and chair holders in
marxist-leninist history and economics. And so, down to the lowest district level. 
The same work was done with all posts of the state apparatus (central,
republican, local) — ministers and their deputies, members of ministerial collegia,
chiefs of all the directorates and a long list of jobs down the ladder in government
administrations, as well as in the separate machinery of the soviets, to the lowest
rank the CC still wanted on its roster. 
The numbers of posts involved in each ministry are also available, but grouping
them by hierarchical categories is more revealing: out of the total of 41,883
“nomenklatura positions,” 4,836 were in the central apparatus of all the top-level
administrations. This top stratum — some 12% of the nomenklatura list — should
be confronted with data taken from the Central Statistical Office detailing the totals
and the categories of the whole state apparatus.32 The CC list turns out to have
included about one third of the very “first league” of bosses about 160,000
strong — 105,000 of them working in the central governmental apparatus, located
mostly in Moscow, with an additional 55,000 working in central administrative
bodies (ministries and agencies) of the republics. It means first that the big mass of
officials with managerial ranks were included in nomenklatura lists of institutions
below the CC level. “The first league” is only a part of the overall number of bosses,
high and low, big and small in the country’s administrations at large that comprised
at that time about 1,6 million posts (18.8%) out of a total of 8,6 million employees.
But the smaller number of about 6,5 million, by excluding about 1,5 million of
auxiliary personnel (technical staff, cleaning ladies etc.), is more appropriate to
better locate the administrative personnel proper. Included in the “leading” or “top
managers” category were officials running administrative units with lower rank
subordinates reporting to them, or those who had titles (probably also the role) of
“principal” (glavnyi) or “senior” (starshii) specialists (glavnyi inzhener, starshii
inzhener). 
Returning now to the CC “nomenklatura” (part of the “leading” cohort), we are
offered different breakdowns by the structural units they ran or by the broad field in
which they operated. The latter classification shows that the biggest chunk of the
31. Ibid., d. 1628, l. 40-57.
32. “Predvaritel´nye itogi,” written on March 29, 1947, to Voznesenskii (deputy Prime
Minister) by Head Ts. S. U, V. Starovskii, RGAE, f. 1562, op. 329, d. 2332, l. 64-68. 
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CC nomenklatura roster were Party-komsomol officials — 10,533 in all — 24.6%
of the total list. Industry had 8,808 positions  — 20.5%; agencies of state power and
of general state administration had 4,082 positions (9.5%); state defense bodies —
3,954 (9.2%); culture, art and science — 2,305 (5.4%); transportation — 4.4%;
agriculture — 1,548 (3.6%); state security and social order — 1,331 (3.1%);
procuracy and justice — 1,242 (2.9%); foreign relations — 1,169 (2.7%);
construction enterprises — 1,106 (2.6%); procurement and trade — 1022 (2.4%);
social services — 767 (1.8%); trade unions, cooperative societies — 763 (1.8%);
state planning, registration and control — 575 (1.3%); financial and credit
institutions — 406 (1.0%). 
A general reader may not need such details. The one that happens to take a
special interest may find here some food for thought about controlling techniques,
the logic and illogicalities of a centralized staffing policy. A broader professional
profile of officials holding CC’s nomenklatura positions in mid-1946 is also
revealing: 14,778 of them were engineers of different specialties. Less specialized
knowledge among many of the others was compensated (it is claimed) by length of
service. 70% of those who had only primary education, had more than ten years of
service in leadership jobs — a datum that lends itself easily to less optimistic
conclusions. In general, 55.7% of the central nomenklatura cadres did have a
service experience of over ten years. The nomenklatura included even some
non-party people — 3.5% (about 1,400 job holders). Such professional levels were,
of course, inadequate and a vast campaign was afoot to raise the professional
standards of the higher-level cadres by accelerating the training of specialists with
higher education, notably in the higher technical schools and in universities. This
concerned the whole administrative cohort. The educational level of a good half of
the whole state apparatus — including the category of “specialists”  — was still
low in 1947, and would improve considerably over the post-Stalinist years. 
Last but not least, the national composition of the “leading” cohortis significant.
For the whole list Russians represented 66.7%, Ukrainians — 11.3%, Jews — 5.4%
etc. (“etc.” is in the source). In the group of the “zamy” — a pivotal group of
officials —: 80.4% were Russians, 7.3% were Ukrainians, 2.1% Belorussians, 6.4%
Jews, and among the Heads of Main Directorates (nachal´niki glavnykh
upravlenii) — another crucial group inside the top brass — 72% were Russians,
11.5% were Jews, 9.6% were Ukrainians, 2.5% Belorussians, 1% Georgians, 1.6%
Armenians.
How was this supposed to work? 
Rules and decisions on the functioning of the nomenklaturas of party and other
administrative bodies allow us now to talk about the nomenklatura in the plural. 
Nomenklatura lists existed on all the hierarchical ladders — the number of jobs to
fill was not 41,000 but more than a million. Party and state bodies were supposed to
handle their own nomenklaturas through a three-pronged procedure. Depending on
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the status of the jobs involved, they could make their decisions alone, or make
proposals for firing and nominating, the final decisions to be made higher up. Hiring
and firing of a third group of jobs had to be “coordinated” or negotiated with the
higher or lower interested agency — before the final approval was given by the level
properly authorized to do this. All these procedures concern the nomenklaturas of
party and government agencies other than the CC. But even the nomenklatura of the
CC was in itself subject to “layered” decision making. An inkling into these
procedures can be gained from a project of CC procedures concerning its own
nomenklatura list. Nominations, transfers and dismissals from positions listed in CC
nomenklatura jobs could go into effect, formally, only after the CC approved them.
But heads of the authorized agencies — like the Central USSR and Republican
Ministries — did propose candidates for CC nomenklatura posts, and so did ministers
and other heads of institutions on each level of the administrative ladder, who
commanded a nomenklatura of their own. They listened to or offered proposals for
nominations and clearly had a bargaining power in these matters, not only with the
party bodies below the CC but also with the CC and its highest bureaus. 
On the local level, again, a similar procedure was to be applied. In cases when
there were differences between party bodies and ministries or local soviets, they
turned for arbitration to the CC, each side with their respective proposals. All
administrations were obligated to regularly present current materials that
characterized the work of CC nomenklatura nominees and an expanded assessment
for every individual at least once a year. Regional party committees were expected
to deal with cadres of their own level but also help the CC to learn about and
appoint leading cadres to jobs of central importance, by reporting in due course on
weaknesses and merits of leaders of organizations they had knowledge of. 
In the framework of the 1946 revamping of nomenklatura rosters, all party and
state administrative bodies were required to revise and present their own
nomenklatura lists for approval to the CC by October 15, 1946. 
Here is one example: the Moscow Party Committee — an important hub of
nomenklaturas. The “house-keeping” by this Committee of its personnel matters,
was certainly more complicated than in any USSR ministry — Moscow was almost
a mini-state. Its own top brass was on the CC lists, and a somewhat lower layer of
officials — on its own. The three-step decision making applied here too, depending
on what and whose nomenklatura the ranks in question belonged to: for some jobs,
the right to a final approval was in Moscow Committee’s own jurisdiction, others
(obviously of a higher level) depended on a shared decision making, probably with
the CC Secretariat, for the very top positions — bargaining with some level in the
CC, but final approval made there. The Moscow first city party secretary, maybe
even the second, were directly dependent on the Politbiuro. 
In 1947 the Moscow City Committee enlarged its nomenklatura lists by adding
numerous positions in the city’s district committees to the City Committee roster, as
well as secretaries of party committees and bureaus inside all of the ministries and
other central bodies residing in Moscow. Party secretaries in crucial enterprises,
offices and academic institutions in the city were also included. All this amounted to a
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considerable accretion of Moscow’s party’s power. (This is detailed in a 1947 report
by the Upravlenie on the work of the otdel kadrov of Moscow’s Party Committee.) 
The whole nomenklatura depending on the City Party Committee had a list of
4,309 positions, 2,727 were approved by the Moscow party bureau, 708 were negotiated
in the City Committee’s own cadres’ department, 874 had to get final approval
in the CC. 96.2% were party members, 0.4% candidate-members, 3.4% non-party. 
We probably got by now the gist of the procedure and its triple-level distribution
of jurisdictions. But we also know that these or other procedures and rules were not
necessarily followed, not least because of their complexity and unavoidable
fuzziness. In any case, important ministries and other agencies, or important cities
and republics (their Central Committees, their Council of Ministers) had an input in
what the PB (or Secretariat, or just the Upravlenie or other cadres’ departments)
would endorse — they were, as we already know, actually asked to “help” — i.e.
that either they made proposals for final approval upstairs or they could — quite
effectively — dispute a candidacy proposed from above. 
In sum, what we get is a maze: some actions are taken according to rules and
others occur simultaneously according to informal, surreptitious or illegal
practices — the picture of some monolithic and uniform tool of the party’s Center
gets replaced by something much fuzzier. 
The final stage — organization and registration
Nomenklatura lists were frequently changed and shifted according to changing
circumstances and multifarious pressures. Pressure could come from agencies,
especially new ones, to have their top brass included in the CC list or, to the contrary,
insisting that some categories of jobs, especially high-profiled specialists who had a
considerable bargaining power and were often needed urgently, be excluded from the
list. Nomenklatura procedures were too rigid in these cases and they often constrained
the maneuverability and the power of important, especially science-engineering-
based branches. Political and ideological reasons also abounded when decisions of
inclusion-exclusion from the Central nomenklatura were concerned. 
The vast enterprise of providing and controlling leading personnel entailed an
enormous ledger and file-keeping husbandry. Registering-reregistering, gathering
data on so many people, updating their files, studying those who work already and
those still on reserve lists — these operations for which the Upravlenie served as the
main “smithy” were described in a chapter “The registration of cadres,” which
included a report by the Upravlenie, and was entitled “The publication, composition
and itineraries of registration materials.” During the second half of 1947, 2,404
positions were included into the CC nomenklatura and 2,171 were excluded. The
inclusions happened in connection with approving positions for ministries and
vedomstva and adding new ones, exclusions — in connection with decisions to slash
personnel: in the local branches of the procuracy, for ex., 237 were slashed, in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs — 181, in the Ministry of State Security — 210 etc. 
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At the same period, 2,940 people were nominated to nomenklatura positions,
2,166 were dismissed (unclear — some might have been transferred, but never to a
non-nomenklatura post, unless punished). 4,090 personal files were created, 7,171
personal files were cancelled, enough to keep the staff quite busy. All in all, on July
1, 1947, the Upravlenie kept 59,516 personal files for employees on active personal
rolls and 192,039 of those who were removed from personal rolls (but their files
stayed). This already offers an inkling of the problem: considering that the
registration of party membership in general and the special attention given to
leading personnel in particular were central to the party’s philosophy of ruling and
monitoring leading cadres. But distribution and registration generated a great deal
of fuss, a lot of pedantry and a file-keeping system of staggering dimensions. A
project for a registration system — signed by the deputy-chief of the Upravlenie,
Revskii, on January 21, 1948 — offered guidelines for creating “a unified system
of personal-cum-position registry.” In order to achieve it, a long list of various
types of registration documents would be required. Party bodies would be asked to
supply data on all their nominations and dismissals. It was expected they would be
reluctant to tell the truth — because they used to commit quite a lot of irregularities
in this domain. A description of what a “personal file” on each nomenklatura job
holder would be composed of mentions inter alia personal sheets, endless cards to
be filled out, and special index-cards by branch of activity.
Further details about the whole registration system would be overbearing, but it
is already obvious that the effort to be invested in just the clerical aspects of
handling the endless sheets, cards and files (always in need of updating), points to
an air of “surrealism” that permeates the whole enterprise. It makes one think that
the nomenklatura system could work only by constantly breaking at least many of
its own rules. The unwieldy party-state machinery could continue to function on
condition of accepting informal arrangements by all involved, and adapting to
widespread behavior that made many formal procedures irrelevant. My study
shows that this did in fact happen, bringing a degree of realism and a modicum of
badly needed flexibility. If one thinks of the changes that happened during
Khrushchev’s time and later — their substance could be described by precisely this
kind of formal or, more often, tacit acceptance of realities, with a considerable
bending of rules or disregarding them altogether. 
The apparatus’ salaries and the special role of benefits 
Salaries were, of course, essential but the perks, in particular, played a crucial
material and symbolic role. They enabled and shaped a way of life and a certain
self-image, they were a sign of recognition, if not an outright bribe, a cherished set
of gratifications, psychologically more precious than the salary itself — because,
simply, they made the difference. The party brass and staffs were as keen on all
these “goodies” as the other apparaty and, in fact, actually initiated the whole
system of perks and of the scramble for having them. 
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Salaries were themselves composed of a base pay that often was wrapped up in a
changing array of all kind of incentives and inducements — the higher the post the more
liberal not just the salary but also those extras. We get the picture from a “Salary roll of
the CC of CPSU, for 1958”33 that details the salaries paid to each rank among the 1,118
political and 1,085 technical CC personnel — a total of 2,203 people (see Table 1). 
Table 1 – Salary roll of the CC of CPSU, for 1958 (in thousands of rubles)
33. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 75, d. 17, l. 62-67. “Raschet po zarplate TsK KPSS na 1958 god.” 










1,118 leading (politics) personnel (rukovoditeli) – ladder of 28 positions or ranks
1. 8 Central Committee secretaries 8 64
…
…










total all leading personnel 3727,6 44,731
1,085 technical CC personnel – ladder of 131 positions or ranks
1. 
deputy of the Chief account 




… 12 sector secretaries 0,5-0,7 8,4
…
… 5 telephone operators 0,6-0,7
total 1017,8 12,214
total 2,203 CC personnel 4745,4 56,945
salary
supplements 
for length of service, knowledge 
of foreign languages, two monthly salaries
for “rehabilitated officials”
600
total salaries with salary supplements 57,545




1,085 technical personnel 695
total 
expenses for medical allowances 
(1,971 officials)
4,271
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A memo entitled “Ob obsluzhivanii sotrudnikov apparata Ts. K. detskimi
uchrezhdeniiami, domami otdykha i dachnymi khoziaistvami na 1945, 1946”34 and
a plan for 1947 list the following services: day-care centers, nursery schools,
kindergartens, summer and winter camps for children, resting houses for families
for longer stays, for one-day stays. The account meticulously reported on who used
all these facilities, when, for how much per day. 
For each position there was a report on how many institutions, kids or
employees were served, how many working days were needed, for how much per
day. The actual number of such facilities and their cost was not huge, so far — but
they were going to grow over the next years. In fact, the head of the medical care
sector in the CC’s Business Department wrote in September 194935 a projection for
1950 of travel permits for party officials requiring treatment in “special sanatoria”
or sanatoria belonging to agencies other than the CC. He anticipated about 16,998
requests to 10 party-owned sanatoria (listed by name) costing 29,515, 400 and
another 1,000 to sanatoria of other agencies at a cost of 1,700,000. A scribble on the
document asserts that 1,200,000 will be needed for the Business Department’s own
collaborators. 
Expenditures on local party bodies for 194536 had a budgetary structure similar
to the one of the CC.37
What is remarkable is how well and with what meticulous care all this was
documented and budgeted — and this applies to any other, administrative and
political expenditures of the CC. Money and cost were counted seriously in the CC
apparatus — and all the data, to the last penny, are available. We do not hear much
of big money scandals or embezzlement inside the CC: the finances were a neat
operation but — as everything else concerning the party — this information was
top secret. The political reasons for secrecy are known to us, but we also understand
that the special care lavished on the party bureaucracy (and we omitted privileged
access to closed supply networks) — with such an attentive emphasis on scaling the
benefits by rank — had better be kept secret. The practice and the ethos of the
institution did not smack of any “communism” — but this was their business. Ours
is to learn about the institution (and the system) as they were. What can be added
here, in the same context, is that the steep and scrupulously “calibrated” pyramid of
rank and privileges distributed in diminishing size down the ladder, was inducing
those who got there, in the first place — to climb. The best position was only the
one above. The power of any bureaucratic large-scale organizations to instill this
kind of values is indisputable. But most of them do not pretend to harbor egalitarian
ideals. Nor do they control or aim at controlling the whole political system and
society. The one we study here did officially profess egalitarian ideals — but the
34. Ibid., d. 8, l. 296.
35. Ibid., d. 9, l. 54.
36. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 75, d. 3, l. 8.
37. Ibid.
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real thing functioned differently from what official pronouncement wanted us to
believe. The conclusion will elaborate upon this last statement. 
Conclusion
There is no doubt that these post-war years were endowed with many time-bound,
specific features that did not apply later. But my ongoing broader study of the
Soviet bureaucracy convinced me that some basic features of the party’s handling
of personnel in those years — in its own ranks and in government administrations
at large — were there to stay. It was not just “in the past.” But its efficacy was
constantly declining. 
The technique called “nomenklatura” was, or became, the party’s main method
of both supplying cadres to all the positions of importance all over the Soviet
system and for making sure that they follow, broadly speaking, the party line —
whatever it might have been at any particular time. Cadres, as the regime
discovered and preached early on, were a decisive factor and the Central
Committee created a special apparatus that was to deal, in particular, with the
problem of “staffing” — its own party agencies in the first place, and next — the
whole sprawling state machinery. 
It was hoped, officially, that having departments for cadres in all agencies
(supervised by the central Party Body, whatever its current name) would provide a
“weather-proof” method for producing a loyal and effective tool for executing
policies as formulated at the top. Moreover, the selection and control of policy
executors also proceeded from the same source — flowing from the CC down,
through well maintained, faultless lines. Many were made to believe that this
actually worked as intended. The impression even prevailed, and was spread by
some authors that the same procedure tended to insure the entry into the apparatus
of officials with particularly sought after, or encouraged, psychological and cultural
features, not just ideologically loyal, but also basically subservient and conformist
careerists, reflecting the preference and the mentality of those who handle the
personnel lists. If those lower down in the state or party bodies had also some
nominating rights, their being themselves pre-selected nomenklaturshchiki,
presumably assured the continuing supply, down to the lowest rungs, of similar
human specimens. 
Still, on the basis of research already done, including on the nomenklatura
techniques, it is possible to state that although all (or almost all) top positions were
in the safe hands of party members — this did not stop one bit the development of
proclivities inherent in any bureaucracy, including — of course — some features
specific to each case. This is why we can say — even underline — that the Center,
despite its avowed intentions, could not stop “sociology” from doing its job, neither
inside bureaucracy nor in society at large. Not “even” inside the party.
The details we offered show that the staffing of the governing and administering
agencies was not an operation resembling some smooth flow from the center down
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the stream. This was not even how the system functioned formally. The
concentration on the “nomenklatura” of the CC level made sometimes miss the fact
that important layers of officials — as we explained — were on the ministerial or
other agencies’ own nomenklatura — and the same applied to both party and state
echelons. But even this might have created an exaggerated impression of tidiness of
the whole personnel policies. In fact, only part of the positions on each level could
be nominated directly — other positions required “coordination,” had to be
negotiated with a higher or parallel body and we already know that part of the jobs
that were exclusively dependent on the approval of the CC was also, in fact, split
into three levels, with approval rights divided between the PB, the Secretariat and
the cadres’ department. The opening this created for alliances and lobbying
activities on the very top level can easily be perceived. 
Yet, the monopoly of the final approval in the CC did mean in most cases,
precisely, just “approval.” Normally heads of agencies or departments were
supposed “to help” the higher bodies to manage their nomenklatura. This could
mean, in practice, that the minister or another boss of any level in the hierarchy,
could — and was actually expected — to suggest candidates for a CC
nomenklatura post. And many certainly had the means and the skills to fight for
their preferred candidate. 
These facts allow us to state that the whole picture was anything but orderly or
tightly monolithic. The process of cadres selection was not just a decision-making
“ladder,” but rather a process full of loopholes and interaction, in fact, it was an
enormous bargaining field, a cadres market or a transit depot — prokhodnoj
dvor — as some party members bitterly protested already in the 1920s. And
ministers could also apply (and lobby) to include some jobs into the CC
nomenklatura in the first place — or else to remove jobs from this list — if they felt
(or at least argued) that these jobs were too sensitive and mobile for them to be
blocked by stringent CC regulations. That is, there was much more play, more room
to jostle for power than there would have been with the stern imposition of names
from above. 
Moreover, if the decisions concerning the staffing were actually — and quite
officially — distributed over a ladder of nomenklatura lists, the descent down the
“ladder” of job decisions was strewn with interstices due to changing bargaining
abilities and relations of power between the participants and to a powerful impact of
“anomalies” — or “deviant” behavior. The latter consisted of widespread informal or
illegal practices, triggered by devotion to institutional vested interests (frowned upon
officially as manifestation of vedomstvennost´), or by recruiting practices based on
group or family connections, denounced as family-spirit (semeistvennost´).
Lobbying techniques were well-developed and often used to extract additional
resources or cadres from the Center. Lobbying also took a variety of guises, including
the fight for “slack” — a term that denotes the bureaucratic tendency the world over
to accumulate more or less hidden reserves of equipment, machines, labor, money
and personal helpers and deputies. “Slack” also means cultivating alliances with party
and state officials indispensable to lobbying and the other tools of pressure politics. 
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 These facts point to the obvious: despite the intention of the nomenklatura
system, the entry into the administrations, including the party’s own, was only
partly mastered from above. Many people got their jobs through diverse entries and
channels — including independent and lateral ones. Thus the “nomenklatura,” as a
“ruling class” designated by uniform methods was not, in reality, that rigidly
controlled by a central will, or strictly drawn from one preferred pool of candidates.
The class of bosses, bigger and smaller, came “in all sizes” through different
channels, contacts, pressures and other combinations of factors. In many services
they also came because they were talented. 
Had the method of nomenklatura selection been as simple and foolproof as the
party apparatus hoped, the job of this or that cadres’ department in Moscow, as well
as the job of the latter-day researcher, would have been just as simple. However,
despite the supposed “class solidarity” of the privileged nomenklaturshchiki, and
the dependence on and devotion towards the most powerful among them which that
implies, the historical record tells a different story. 
But the rough-and-tumble world of Soviet bureaucracy was not responsive to
any one controlling method. In addition to the powerful controlling agencies we
already mentioned, a host of additional bodies was constantly needed, often
carrying the designation of “special” or “extraordinary”: “extraordinary” political
departments (on and off), “special” or “extraordinary party organizers” to become
envoys to institutions considered of critical importance, special CC bureaus for
vulnerable administrative or ethnic areas, displacing in fact the regular local party
bodies — most of them nomenklaturshchiki themselves. 
When surveying the controlling agencies, some endowed formally with
extraordinary powers, we noticed a rather astonishing fact — they did not last very
long. The more powerful the controlling agency became the sooner it would be
scuttled, by being actually disbanded or by being deprived of potent means of
insight and intervention. The “Nomenklatura” (in the sense of the whole cohort of
officials) fought back against any agency that wanted to control it too efficiently.
Under Stalin the battle against manifestations of bureaucratic self-interest —
against its “sociology” as it were — took on pathological and deadly forms. After
him, the Center still continued to fight against all kinds of bureaucratic proclivities
or malpractices — sometimes by showering more privileges on this already
privileged groups. But it all ended, finally, in losing control of the ship because
“nomenklatura” as a nomination-dismissal power was weaker than the internal
drives of a bureaucracy whose main controller resided in one party Center. Party
membership could not mean much per se inside a bureaucracy where everybody
who was anybody was a member and on some nomenklatura or other. His career,
well-being and importance finally depended on bureau-ministerial interests.
Appropriately enough, people from their milieu could also be found, seated high in
the same Center, i.e. in the CC or on influential policy-making. Commissions that
were often constituted to solve an urgent problem or respond to some crisis or other
were also staffed by the same, as Russians called them, sanovniki (the regime’s
grandees). 
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The widespread idea that this huge machinery was picking types of persons
responding to a preferred blueprint, invariably fanatical, invariably monolithic
ideologically, predictably mediocre and dumb, necessarily also always self
seeking — cannot be accepted. Such effects and results actually materialized to
some extent. On the other hand we still know these apparaty very little. In order, for
instance, to ascertain the psychological, ethical or ideological make of the party or
state cadres, preconceived ideas or limited personal observations are no guide.
There are many administrations on earth that easily lean towards, say, authoritarian
personalities, discourage brilliance or talent, and promote in-house loyalty and
conformism. In Russia, I personally observed some high-level bosses, in the army
and elsewhere, notably on the lower rungs of different agencies. The conclusion
that I was facing obvious “blockheads” came easily and justifiably to mind. But
jumping to conclusions from such impressions would mean just that: “jumping.”
Much more sociological, cultural and personal variety and even ideological
diversity existed and could be observed, and the abundance of operators ready for
and skillful in informal — even quite deviant — lobbying make the exaggeration of
the nomenklatura’s potency rather misleading. We are still far from being able to
assess Soviet bureaucracies, at different times, from the point of view of their
abilities, skills and mentalities. And many less subtle tasks have to be tackled first
in researching the Soviet state apparatus. 
Handling all the top cadres of the whole party and state personnel by a
department in the CC was not a very realistic proposition in the first place, except,
no doubt, at the launching of a new political “offensive.” The ever more intricate
personnel problems in an ever more complex state machinery kept literally blowing
up the Center’s administrative structures, forced it to try centralization, then to turn
to decentralization, back to recentralization again, almost cyclically. Ideally the
Center would like its operations to run smoothly and efficiently — and prove it by
avoiding unwieldy structures in its own apparatus. After all, unwieldy and
inefficient structures were the very thing the party apparatus tried to combat. In
fact, they managed to keep the numbers of the party’s own paid officialdom quite
steady, as 1946-1948 and later-date figures prove. But the efficiency of this top
controller was another matter. 
The heads of the bureaucracy — some of them Politbiuro members themselves —
and the party’s apparatus (with their whole nomenklatura paraphernalia) were trying
to handle a complicated maze. This is why the nomenklatura was not just
controlling — it was also “huffing and puffing.”
Consequently, more was going on than just fixing lists and running the show
according to lists and apparatus — like instructions and orders. The supposed
magic ability of the party to afford a tailor cut bureaucratic machinery made to
order is just a legend. It is true that people of the nomenklatura list were — as an
agglomerate — the rulers of all levels of the hierarchy. Precisely so and it meant, as
said, a power game — lobbying, intriguing, bribing, yielding etc., amounting in
actual fact to some kind of power sharing already in Stalin’s time, and a fullness of
power for the bureaucracy after Stalin. Such a powerful position for the
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bureaucracy was new to Russia’s history. And new even to the Soviet system
itself — and it had to end in a rewriting of the relations between state and party
bureaucracies. The potency of “nomenklatura”-based techniques of control of the
latter over the former was fading very fast, partly during the 1960s and especially
during the years called “zastoi” that coincided with the rule of Brezhnev as
“gensek.” 
The whole complex of cadres’ policy had a feedback effect on and against the party
leadership. The meetings of all the ruling bodies — Secretariat, Orgbiuro,
Politbiuro — were clogged with “personalia” (personal´nye voprosy) and other
practical details that left little time, energy or even competence for serious policy-
making. The system in those years functioned, paradoxically, sometimes better,
sometimes worse, only because spontaneous forces at work — I call it “sociology” —
caused a loosening of the nomenklatura grip (and of the concurrent need to create
more controlling apparaty). The aging regime had no choice but to adapt itself to the
unavoidable. A “radical” response resembling Stalinist purges was not available
anymore. Purges were actually helpless even then. It allows us to speak
metaphorically of the backlash or revenge of the bureaucratic giant against the smaller
bureaucratic controller that kept drowning in its paper-flood and the minutiae
engendered by an obsolete way of conducting the affairs of a modern state. 
The documents reflecting the situation after the war show quite convincingly
one of the key factors that made the political agency — namely the party — falter
and lose its political effectiveness. Engaging itself directly in running the economy
of the country that required the inefficient nomenklatura procedures, could not
prevent a much stronger process: the administrative agencies directly responsible
for executing the relevant jobs “economized” the party through this “backdoor,”
transformed it into yet another administration and opened the door to its
assimilation by the larger administrative machine. It is interesting that a party
secretary like A.A. Kuznetsov, supposedly quoting Stalin, characterized this
phenomenon as “being bribed” by the economic agencies or even by a more telling
diagnosis: the party apparatus became “an appendix” to the managers of the
economy (which certainly included the armament industries). At that time such
phenomena could still be at least partly explained away by the wartime or post-war
conditions, and hence amenable to being reversed. But the process of getting
enmeshed with ministerial apparaty was not stoppable. The only chance for the so
called “party” to be obeyed, or look like being obeyed, consisted in accepting the
inevitable — becoming an appendix to and part of the upper layers of the
governmental machinery. “Till death do us part.”
Exploring the vagaries of the nomenklatura procedures shows a political
administration  — itself a bureaucracy — at the helm of a multi-million membership
that had nothing to do with political decision-making. Even this “political
administration” lost its power under Stalin, regained some of it under Khrushchev,
but finally yielded not to any leader but to a process (of bureaucratization) that put an
end to the fiction called “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” The party’s
“depolitization” — in the sense of losing the ability to formulate policies, to offer
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capable leaders, to conceive of and impose reforms (or any serious policy, for that
matter) to match the depth of the sea changes that took place in the country and in the
world. But the bureaucracy continued its sway unabatedly — the historical paradoxes
at work here were astounding: the economic situation kept worsening but the ruling
bureaucracy was thriving. Political interference and leadership were urgently needed
to save the country from a collapse, but the “logic” of the administrative Dibbuk on
the loose undermined the political agency (or whatever still survived of it) and made
redundant the small wheel that was trying to give orders to the big one. The final
irony, quite pertinent to Russia’s post-Soviet situation, resides in the fact that
although “the party-state” has gone — the ministries have stayed on. 
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